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JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSONIMPACT ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIESt
Philip B. Kurland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Baum Memorial Lectures, although of comparatively recent origin, have already gained great significance for their celebration of the protection of civil rights and civil liberties as a primary
endeavor of those dedicated to the rule of law. The lectureship has,
therefore, come to honor the lecturer no less than the subject. And
I am, of course, pleased to assume the mantle of those who have
preceded me.
I must, nevertheless, confess to being somewhat uncomfortable
in the role. For surely there is something gauche about preaching
heterodoxy from a pulpit which, like all pulpits, is by definition
dedicated to orthodoxy. Let me state my problem.
Civil liberties in the context of the law, and particularly Supreme Court law, reveals to me two distinct modes of thought
which, for convenience rather than description, I would label the
"libertarian tradition" and the "liberal tradition." (I speak not at
all here of the "conservative tradition.") There is, I think, not much
difference between the goals of the legal libertarian and the legal
liberal. For both, the objective is a free people in a democratic
society. But freedom and democracy are not words without multiple
meanings. Indeed, there are societies that call themselves democratic and their people free which nevertheless epitomize the very
opposite of what most of us would mean when we use those words.
And there is, as well, a substantial difference between the libertarian and the liberal as to the appropriate means to their jointly
defined goal.
As I see it, the legal libertarian tends to think in terms of the
absolute and unconditioned protection of asserted civil liberties,
almost without acknowledgement of the possibility of any legitit These remarks were originally delivered at the University of Illinois College
of Law, October 14, 1976, as the second 1976-77 lecture of the David C. Baum
Lectures on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
* William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, The University of
Chicago. A.B. 1942, Univ. of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1944, HarvardLaw School.
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mate competing values. For many of them, the mere assertion of a
claim labeled civil liberties is sufficient to justify its encompassment within the protection of our Constitution. I would say here
that the tradition is represented by such great jurists as Hugo Black
and William Douglas, as Wiley Rutledge and Frank Murphy, as
Earl Warren and William Brennan, as Henry Edgerton and Skelly
Wright. You may derive from this roster that the libertarian tradition, for the most part, includes also a commitment to judicial activism, particularly in support of civil liberties. But you will recognize,
too, that, while all libertarians may be judicial activists, not all
judicial activists are libertarians. In gross, then, the libertarian as I
perceive him is dedicated to a creed that societal salvation lies in
the maintained primacy of all claimed civil rights and that the
saviour is the judicial branch of government.
My discomfort lies in the fact that I believe the Baum Lectures
to have been founded to further this libertarian creed. Yet neither
my subject, Mr. Justice Jackson, nor I, properly can be called an
adherent of the faith. We belong rather to the liberal tradition, a
tradition that earned the first Lord Halifax the opprobrious sobriquet, "The Trimmer."' For the liberal tradition is, indeed, a tradition born in doubt rather than faith, and maintained by skepticism
rather than by belief.
Perhaps the American tradition does not derive, as Professor
Bickel would have it, from Edmund Burke. But surely Bickel, the
foremost academic apologist for the liberal tradition, accurately
described it in his posthumously published book, The Morality of
Consent, when he wrote:
The Age of Reason continues, if not quite as pretentiously and selfconfidently as it began. Precisely for that reason, however, the problem of which Burke spoke is even more acute for us. A valueless
politics and valueless institutions are shameful and shameless and,
what is more, man's nature is such that he finds them, and life with
and under them, insupportable. Doctrinaire theories of the rights of
man, on the other hand, serve us no better than Burke thought they
would. The computing principle is still all we can resort to, and we
always return to it following some luxuriant outburst of theory in the
Supreme Court, whether the theory is of an absolute right to contract,
or to speak, or to stand mute, or to be private. We find our visions of
1. "A Constitution cannot make itself; some body made it; not at once but at several
times. It is alterable; and by that draweth nearer Perfection; and without suiting itself to
differing Times and Circumstances, it could not live. Its Life is prolonged by changing seasonably the several Parts of it at several times." THE COMPLETE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE, FIRST
MARQUESS OF HALIFAx 211 (Raleigh Ed. 1912).
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good and evil and the denominations we compute where Burke told
us to look, in the experience of the past, in our tradition, in the
secular religion of the American republic. The only abiding thing, as
Brandeis used to repeat . . . is change, but the past should control
it, or at least its pace. We hold to the values of the past provisionally
only in the knowledge that they will change, but we hold to them as
guides.
Our problem . . . is that we cannot govern, and should not, in
submission to the dictates of abstract theories, and that we cannot
live, much less govern, without some "uniform rule and scheme of
life," without principles, however provisionally and skeptically
held ...
Since few principles are inscribed sharply in the Constitution
itself, the Supreme Court speaking in the name of the Constitution
fills, in part, the need for middle-distance principles. . . . It proffers,
with some important exceptions, a series of admonitions, an
eighteenth-century checklist of subjects; it does this cautiously and
with some skepticism. It recognizes that principles are necessary,
have evolved, and should continue to evolve in the light of history and
changing circumstance. That. . . is the Constitution as the Framers
wrote it. And that is what it must be in a secular democratic society,
where the chief reliance for policy-making is placed in the political
process.
• . . Few definite, comprehensive answers on matters of social
and economic policy can be deduced from it. The judges, themselves
abstracted from, removed from political institutions by several orders
of magnitude, ought never to impose an answer on the society merely
because it seems prudent and wise to them personally, or because
they believe that an answer-always provisional-arrived at by the
political institutions is foolish. ...
Yet in the end, and even if infrequently, we do expect the Court
to give us principle, the limits of which can be sensed but not defined
and are communicated more as cautions than as rules. Confined to a
profession, the explication of principle is disciplined, imposing standards of analytical candor, rigor, and clarity. The Court is to reason,
not feel, to explain and justify principles it pronounces to the last
possible rational decimal point. It may not itself generate values, out
of the stomach, but must seek to relate them-at least analogically-to judgments of history and moral philosophy ....
For the liberal tradition, the representative jurists are not less
than those of the libertarian camp. They include Holmes, Brandeis,
and Cardozo, Frankfurter and Stone, Learned Hand and Henry
2.

BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 24-26 (1975).
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Friendly, and certainly Robert Jackson, the subject of this essay.
Those of you who know the extrajudicial writings of Judge
Learned Hand 3-and I commend them to everyone who cherishes
the high style of a great essayist-will find their echoes in my quotation from Bickel. You will also find those echoes in Paul Freund's
conclusion of an essay devoted to the same subject that I address
here,' an essay that makes all I am about to say redundant. Probably because it would be difficult to speak of Jackson as a civil
libertarian, Freund ended his paper with praise of Jackson's investment in the uniqueness of each case that came before him, and next
with compliments for the style and wit with which his opinions were
written. Freund's third conclusory point demonstrated the contemporary relevance of Jackson's work: "The Justice contrived to focus
on the twin evils that are most corrupting in a legal order: secrecy
where there should be disclosure; publicity where there should be
privacy.'"I
Finally, Professor Freund concluded:
More generally, he left a legacy of concern for the inner self, the
free mind and spirit on which a free society ultimately depends. In
an era of growing exploration and manipulation of the deepest recesses of the mind, as well as the far reaches of outer space, a time
of increasing anonymity and submersion in the mass, a period of a
morality of statistics, a poignant reminder from Justice Jackson of
who each of us is-the vagrant, mysterious, unservile, yet responsible
self-is a heritage to be husbanded and treasured.'
It is significant that Freund titled his piece "Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights." For in the concern for the individual
rather than the class or group, the concern for "the vagrant, mysterious, unservile, yet responsible self," is to be found one of the
essential separations of the liberal from the libertarian tradition. It
is the singularity of the individual, what I have elsewhere called
"The Private I," ' that makes the tradition for which Hand and
Jackson were the most elegant judicial spokesmen in an era in which
the individual has become more and more subordinated to the
collective, whether it be the state or some other form of Leviathan.
Obviously I cannot, in the space of a single lecture, hope to
3. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1952). A new paperback edition has just been published by The University of Chicago Press.

4.

Freund, Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights, in MR.
His HONOR 29 (1969).

JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR

LECTURES IN

5.
6.

Id. at 56.
Id.

7.

KURLAND, THE PRIVATE I: SOME RELECTIONS ON PRIVACY AND THE CONSTrrUTION
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replicate the contents of Jackson's judicial efforts on the Supreme
Court, even limited to the single field of civil liberties and civil
rights. Mr. Justice Jackson's opinions epitomized the individuality
that he so clearly cherished. They defy both summary and easy
classification. His was probably the best writing that a Justice of the
Supreme Court has ever produced. It is not readily captured in the
prosaic and deadening words of a mere critic. I shall endeavor,
therefore, to deal with but a few examples of his opinions and to
allow his voice to come through directly by means of extensive quotation. If I succeed in my purpose, you may then seek out the corpus
of his work for yourself to gain understanding, where I can offer only
direction.
II.

OF FLAG SALUTES AND SIMILAR MATTERS

A clear distinction between libertarian and liberal is to be
found in the latter's notion that the Constitution afforded protection to individuals and, therefore, to all, rather than to classes and,
therefore, only to some. For Jackson, it would seem, constitutional
liberties could not derive from or be confined to membership in a
group or a class. Such liberties as the Constitution afforded to members of a group or class must be liberties claimable by everyone.
Moreover, it would seem possible for a class or group jointly not to
have the constitutional rights that each individual in that class or
group may have by himself.
The judicial origins of such propositions as these, so far as Mr.
Justice Jackson's tenure on the Court is concerned, came during his
second term, when the Jehovah's Witnesses were being given so
much attention by the Court. Indeed, Mr. Justice Jackson's most
famous civil liberties decision was rendered in 1943 in his opinion
in the second flag salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.I Three years earlier the Court, through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, among others, and over the lone dissent of then Mr. Justice
Stone, held that the Jehovah's Witnesses were not entitled to exemption from compulsory flag salute laws because the compulsory
flag salute was not an invasion of their freedom of religious exercise.9
The case came back to the Court after, in the interim, Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy had changed their minds.'0 They had
changed their minds about the answer to the question that had been
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
10. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623 (1942).
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raised in Gobitis, the first flag salute case: "We believe that the
statute before us fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion
secured to the appellees by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."" But, according to Jackson, the spokesman for the Court,
the question in Gobitis was not the proper question to be addressed
in Barnette:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held. While
religion supplies appellees' motive for enduring the discomforts of
making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these
religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional
liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether nonconformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first
find power to make the salute a legal duty."
Although the majority opinion frequently is misread even today
as a religious freedom ruling, perhaps because of the concurring
opinions of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, Jackson's different position could not have come as a surprise to his brethren. It was clear
to them that Jackson would espouse no such cause as special privilege for Jehovah's Witnesses. Earlier in the term, the Court had
dealt with a series of Jehovah's Witnesses cases involving municipal
restrictions on their right to proselytize by ringing doorbells, soliciting funds, and seeking allegiance to church doctrine that those of
more conventional religious faiths found totally abhorrent. It was in
these cases that Mr. Justice Jackson dissented from finding special
constitutional protections in the religious freedom clause.
In a composite minority opinion, filed in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette,'3 Jackson wrote: "I had not supposed that the rights of
secular and non-religious communciations were more narrow or in
any way inferior to those of avowed religious groups." 4 He went
farther, thus putting himself beyond the pale of some modern academic and judicial dogmas that minorities are entitled to preferences that may be denied to majorities-however one defines those
terms-as he wrote in Jeanette:
The First Amendment grew out of an experience which taught
that society cannot trust the conscience of a majority to keep its
religious zeal within the limits that a free society can tolerate. I do
not think it any more intended to leave the conscience of a minority
11.
12.
13.
14.

319 U.S. at 643.
Id. at 634-35.
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
Id. at 179.
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to fix its limits. Civil government cannot let any group ride roughshod5 over others simply because their "consciences" tell them to do
SO.'

For Jackson, if not his libertarian brethren, there was a weighing
of interests to be conducted. The claims of the Jehovah's Witnesses
in the solicitation cases impinged on the claims of those on whom
they imposed their message. Jackson would find the balance in
favor of the latter, the imposed on rather than the imposers. If the
Court's valid precedents precluded such activities as those of the
Jehovah's Witnesses when indulged by others, as they did, even
those who could aspire to Mr. Justice Douglas's colorful appellation
of "colporteur," were not specially privileged.
These Witnesses, in common with all others, have extensive rights to
proselyte and propagandize. These of course include the right to oppose and criticize the Roman Catholic Church or any other denomination. These rights are, and should be held to be, as extensive as any
orderly society can tolerate in religious disputation. The real question
is where their rights end and the rights of others begin."6
For Jackson, therefore, the flag-salute case was easier. At least
it was easier in one respect:
The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into
collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin. But the
refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole
conflict is between authority and the rights of the individual. 7
Stating the question that way, Jackson answered it. In a conflict
between rights of the individual and the claims of Leviathan, the
Constitution insists that the individual prevail.
In Gobitis, Frankfurter had stated the same issue but had come
down with a different conclusion."8 For Frankfurter, the conflict
between the interests of the nation and the interests of the individual were for resolution by the legislature not the judiciary. But
neither Frankfurter, nor Stone, nor Black, nor Douglas, nor Murphy
had asked the right question. And there is no way to get the right
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 178.
319 U.S. at 630.
Id. at 636-37.
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answer except by asking the right question. "The question which
underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed
upon the individual by official authority under powers committed
to any political organization under our Constitution."'"
The question was not whether an individual was entitled to
exemption from a valid legislative order, the question was whether
the legislative order was valid. And surely, the Jacksonian question
was a properly Jeffersonian question to be addressed to a national
government under a Constitution of delegated powers. It did not
quite fit with the notion of state authority whose powers were not
delegated to it by the national Constitution. So Jackson had to
resort quickly, as he did, to the limitations on state authority to be
found in the First Amendment. But it was not a religious freedom
proposition, nor even an orthodox free speech construction. He had
both to deny the liberal notion of judicial self-abnegation and to
create a First Amendment principle to support a right of disobedience to an invalid law.
First, the Bill of Rights was promulgated to remove certain
subjects from the legislative realm. Or, in Jackson's words:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. 0
Second, it is clear that mere rationality of legislative purpose
cannot justify legislative action that was beyond the legislative ken.
It did not matter, therefore, that judges were not specially competent to judge the wisdom of the legislation:
True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb selfconfidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty
was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and
that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the
mildest supervision over men's affairs. We must transplant these
rights to a soil in which the laissez-faireconcept or principle of noninterference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
19.
20.

Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 638.
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advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of
society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls. These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliability
and cast us more than we would choose upon our own judgment. But
we act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by
force of our commissions. 2'
It was not a proper objective of the state to achieve uniformity.
"Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of
the graveyard. 2 2 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." One must wonder what Mr. Justice Jackson would think
about the uniformities imposed today in the name of egalitarianism.
Here is the liberal judicial creed with all its internal conflicts
showing. They are the conflicts of our democratic society. The individual is free and supreme, subject to majority rule in those areas
where the majority is authorized to rule, and the realm of majority
rule has been greatly extended, but not with regard to matters of
faith, or speech or ideas unless that speech or ideas or faith does
specific harm to others. Above all, for the liberal jurisprude, responsibility was an attribute of liberty. There was a duty to the society,
but that did not include an obligation to submit to compulsion of
thought. No little red book, not even a red-white-and-blue one, can
be tolerated.
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. . . . [F]reedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as
to things that touch the heart of the existing order. 4

m.

THE ALIENS IN OUR MIDST

The Jacksonian concern for the individual is shown in still another context. Since I am limited here to a sampling of the Justice's
opinions, I have selected some from his individual expressions about
the treatment of aliens. The alien is probably the least privileged
of persons to seek succor from the courts of the United States, at
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

639-40.
641.
642.
641-42.
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least if he is an alien not yet legally admitted to our borders. I have
selected these not only because they are idiosyncratic factual situations, but because Jackson used these opinions to state some of his
more basic notions about the fundamentals of our jurisprudence.
It would appear-both from the document itself and the relevant decisions-that the Constitution affords the unadmitted alien
no comfort whatsoever. And so, for the most part, Jackson speaking
frequently on behalf of these woebegone creatures was speaking in
dissent. When he did speak, he did not attempt to force the Constitution to cover what it clearly did not cover. He did, however, put
congressional legislation into the press of common sense in order to
squeeze from it humane conclusions.
Two opinions are of primary interest here. Both are concerned
with the admission to the country of aliens. The first is the "German
war bride case," United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,15 in
which Jackson's appeal to his brethren failed, but ultimately succeeded in securing relief by executive and legislative clemency."6
The second was Shaughnessy v. Mezei,27 the man-without-a-country
story, whose ultimate outcome I do not know.
The Ellen Knauff case involved a congressional act of compassion which provided that war brides of American servicemen could
be admitted to this country without meeting the qualifications imposed on other aliens. As a safeguard, however, Congress provided
that the Attorney General could deny admission in any particular
case to protect the security of the United States. Ellen Knauff was
a German war bride who was denied admission by the Attorney
General, without hearing and without stated reason for the exclusion. Jackson spoke in dissent on behalf of himself and Justices
Black and Frankfurter.
No constitutional argument was raised by the dissenters, perhaps because 1960 preceded in time the notion of constitutional
penumbras and haloes. And Jackson's opinion opened with a dis28
claimer:
I do not question the constitutional power of Congress to authorize immigration authorities to turn back from our gates any alien or
class of aliens. But I do not find that Congress has authorized an
abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife of an American citizen without a hearing.
25.
26.
27.
28.

338 U.S. 537 (1950).

See KNAUFF,

THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1974).
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Due process of law is a rule of construction as well as a constitutional doctrine. Given the opportunity to read the statute as affording elementary procedural due process or denying it, Jackson set out
reasons for rejecting procedures that suggested origins in Franz
Kafka's novels:
[T]he government tells the Court that not even a court can find
out why the girl is excluded. But it says we must find that Congress
authorized this treatment of war brides and, even if we cannot get any
reason for it, we must say it is legal; security requires it.
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed
in its name. The menace to the security of this country, be it great
as it may, from this girl's admission is as nothing compared to the
menace to free institutions inherent in procedures of this pattern. In
the name of security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions
on evidence that is secret, because security might be prejudiced if it
were brought to light in hearings. The plea that evidence of guilt must
be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the
malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to
play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.21

This was a lesson which, had it been learned, would have stood
us in good stead from then to now, from the pre-McCarthy period
to the post-Watergate period. But Jackson did not prevail. Another
alien case, argued the same day as Knauff, but decided a month
later, saw Mr. Justice Jackson writing for the majority. The case
was Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath30 and the question was whether
the procedural hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act were applicable to deportation proceedings against an
alien who was alleged to have entered the country illegally. Once
again the issue was made one of statutory construction, but that
construction was forced in part because its opposite would raise
constitutional difficulties:
But the difficulty with any argument premised on the proposition that the deportation statute does not require a hearing is that,
without such hearing, there would be no constitutional authority for
deportation. The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same source as Congress' power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that
body. ...
. . . When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one,
29.
30.

Id. at 551.
339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves issues basic to
human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands
to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself. It might be
difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of
impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like
of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less
vital matters of property rights are at stake.3'
It was, however, the Knauff attitude and not the Wong Sung
position that prevailed when the Mezei case came before the Court
a few years later. Again Justices Black and Frankfurter were in
dissent with Jackson, but only Frankfurter joined the Jackson opinion. The facts are even now hard to believe. In Jackson's words:
What is our case? In contemplation of law, I agree, it is that of
an alien who asks admission to the country. Concretely, however, it
is that of a lawful and law-abiding inhabitant of our country for a
quarter of a century, long ago admitted for permanent residence, who
seeks to return home. After a foreign visit to his aged and ailing
mother that was prolonged by disturbed conditions in Eastern Europe, he obtained a visa for admission issued by our consul and returned to New York. There the Attorney General refused to honor his
documents and turned him back as a menace to this Nation's security. This man, who seems to have led a life of unrelieved insignificance, must have been astonished to find himself suddenly putting the
Government of the United States in such fear that it was afraid to
tell him why it was afraid of him. He was shipped and reshipped to
France, which twice refused him landing. Great Britain declined, and
no other European country has been found willing to open its doors
to him. Twelve countries of the American Hemisphere refused his
applications. Since we proclaimed him a Samson who might pull
down the pillars of our temple, we should not be surprised if peoples
less prosperous, less strongly established and less stable feared to
take him off our timorous hands. . . . For nearly two years he was
held in custody of the immigration authorities of the United States
at Ellis Island, and if the Government has its way he seems likely to
perhaps for life, for a cause known only to
be detained indefinitely,
32
the Attorney General.
The question was whether the unwanted man could secure release from custody by habeas corpus. The Government argued that
he was not detained by them. He was free to leave Ellis Island at
any time, except to enter the United States. Jackson had little
31.
32.

Id. at 49-51.
345 U.S. at 219-20 (footnotes omitted).
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doubt that he was effectively in custody and that the Great Writ was
appropriate to the circumstances:
Fortunately it is still startling, in this country, to find a person
held indefinitely in executive custody without accusation of crime or
judicial trial. Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymeade, pledged that no free
man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by
the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges of
England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these
immunities from executive restraint. Under the best tradition of
Anglo-American law, courts will not deny hearing to an unconvicted
prisoner just because he is an alien whose keep, in legal theory, is just
outside our gates. Lord Mansfield, in the celebrated case holding that
slavery was unknown to the common law of England, ran his writ of
slave, and
habeas corpus in favor of an alien, an African Negro
3
against the master of a ship at anchor in the Thames.1
What then was the constitutional question posed by the detention of this alien? The standard is that of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which Jackson saw as having two attributes, substantive and procedural. There was no substantive due
process right to be relieved of custody. If the Government had cause
for his detention, it could not be denied that power.
Substantively, due process of law renders what is due to a strong
state as well as to a free individual. It tolerates all reasonable measures to insure the national safety, and it leaves a large, at times a
potentially dangerous, latitude for executive judgment as to policies
and means.
After all, the pillars which support our liberties are the three
branches of government, and the burden could not be carried by our
own power alone. ...
I conclude that detention of an alien would not be inconsistent
with substantive due process, provided-and this is where my dissent
begins-he is accorded procedural due process of law.3
Procedural due process is a different matter. And procedural
due process, unlike substantive due process, is essentially in the
keeping of the judicial branch. It invoked the special expertise that
was not available to either the executive or the legislative branches
to determine:
33.
34.

Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 222, 224.
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Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due
process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires.
Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is
technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political
branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy
which comprise substantive law. s
Jackson saw the evils of executive detention in the recent history of
the totalitarian states, both Nazi Germany, the recent menace to
civilization, and Communist Russia, then regarded as the current
menace to civilization. Jackson conceded his anti-Russian bias, but
suggested that bias extended to detesting imitation of their procedures, as well as their substantive principles. He concluded Mezei
as he had begun Knauff:
Congress has ample power to determine whom we will admit to
our shores and by what means it will effectuate its exclusion policy.
The only limitation is that it may not do so by authorizing United
States officers to take without due process of law the life, the liberty
or the property of an alien who has come within our jurisdiction; and
that means he must meet a fair hearing with a fair notice of the
charges.
It is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice and
country. No one can
fair dealing would menace the security of 3this
6
make me believe that we are that far gone.
Allow me to shift from the somber mood by invoking two other
ppinions of Mr. Justice Jackson in this area of alien rights.
In McGrath v. Kristensen,3 7 the question was whether an alien,
whose temporary visitor status was altered because the outbreak of
war prevented his return to his homeland, had thus become a permanent alien subject to military service. If he had thus become a
resident and chosen not to enter military service, he was subject to
deportation. The Court charitably held that the temporary visitor
was not subject to such conscription and therefore not subject to
deportation.
Jackson's concurring opinion is noteworthy not for its substantive law-it contains none-but as a felicitous form of confession of
35. Id. at 224.
36. Id. at 228.
37. 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
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error. I quote it in part, for its lightening as well as enlightening
effects:
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court. But since it
is contrary to an opinion which, as Attorney General, I rendered in
1940, I owe some words of explanation. . . . I am entitled to say of
that opinion what any discriminating reader must think of it-that
it was as foggy as the statute the Attorney General was asked to
interpret ...
It would be charitable to assume that neither the nominal addressee nor the nominal author of the opinion read it. That, I do not
doubt, explains Mr. Stimson's acceptance of an answer so inadequate
to his questions. But no such confession and avoidance can excuse the
then Attorney General.
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by which a judge may
recede from a prior opinion that has proven untenable and perhaps
misled others. .

.

. Baron Bramwell extricated himself from a some-

what similar embarrassment by saying, "The matter does not appear
to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then."

. .

. Perhaps

Dr. Johnson went to the heart of the matter when he explained a
blunder in his dictionary--"Ignorance, sir, ignorance." But an escape
less self-depreciating was taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said,
rebuffed a barrister's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his Lordship:
"I can only say that I am amazed that a man of my intelligence
should have been guilty of giving such an opinion." If there are other
ways of gracefully and good naturedly surrendering
former views to
3
a better considered position, I invoke them all. 1
In Jordan v. De George,3 the Court held that conspiracy to
defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a "crime
involving moral turpitude" and the alien twice convicted must be
banished from our shores. Justices Jackson, Black and Frankfurter
dissented in an opinion written by Jackson. As usual, Jackson
quickly and concisely stated the question:
Respondent, because he is an alien, and because he has been
twice convicted of crimes the Court holds involve "moral turpitude,"
is punished with a life sentence of banishment in addition to the
punishment which a citizen would suffer for the identical acts. Mr.
Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and I cannot agree, because
we believe the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," as found in
the Immigration Act, has no sufficiently definite meaning to be a
constitutional standard for deportation."
38.

Id. at 176-78 (citations omitted).

39. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
40.

Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
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Jackson's opinion is written in lighthearted tones that deride
the sanctimonious and self-righteous grounds for Chief Justice Vinson's majority opinion. But the lightness of touch does not conceal
the seriousness of his propositions:
: * *The Court concludes that fraud is "a contaminating component
in any crime" and imports "moral turpitude." The fraud involved
here is nonpayment of a tax. The alien possessed and apparently
trafficked in liquor without paying the Government its tax. That, of
course, is a fraud on the revenues. But those who deplore the traffic
regard it as much an exhibition of moral turpitude for the Government to share its revenues as for respondents to withhold them. Those
others who enjoy the traffic are not notable for scruples as to whether
liquor has a law-abiding pedigree. So far as this offense is concerned
with whiskey, it is not particularly un-American, and we see no reason to strain to make the penalty for the same act so much more
severe in the case of an alien "bootlegger" than it is in the case of
the native "moonshiner." I have never discovered that disregard of
the Nation's liquor taxes excluded a citizen from our best society and
I see no reason why it should banish an alien from our worst.
But it is said he has cheated the revenues and the total is computed in high figures. If "moral turpitude" depends on the amount
involved respondent is probably entitled to a place in its higher
brackets. Whether by popular test the magnitude of the fraud would
be an extenuating or an aggravating circumstance, we do not know.
We would suppose the basic morality of a fraud on the revenues
would be the same for petty as for great cheats. But we are not aware
of any keen sentiment of revulsion against one who is a little niggardly on a customs declaration, or who evades a sales tax, a local
cigarette tax, or fails to keep his account square with a parking meter.
But perhaps what shocks is not the offense so much as the conviction.
We should not forget that criminality is one thing-a matter of
law-and that morality, ethics and religious teachings are another.
Their relations have puzzled the best of men. Assassination, for example, whose criminality no one doubts, has been the subject of
serious debate as to its morality. This does not make crime less criminal, but it shows on what treacherous grounds we tread when we
undertake to translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case.
We usually end up by condemning all that we personally disapprove
and for no better reason than that we disapprove it. In fact, what
better reason is there? Uniformity and equal protection of the law can
come only from a statutory definition of fairly stable and confined
bounds. 4'
41.

Id. at 240-42 (footnote omitted).
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I do not mean to tell you that Jackson was always on the side
of angels, even in this area of the law. He had no difficulty writing
a persuasive opinion for the Court that Congress could
"constitutionally . . . deport a legally resident alien because of
membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act, 1940."42 But he continued to
insist, if still in dissent, that, before an alien may be deported, or
convicted for not making himself available for deportation, the
premises of the governmental act must be proved to a3 court in
accordance with the requirements of due process of law.
The opinions of Jackson in this field reveal again that the essential feature of the liberal judge is his commitment to procedural due
process, not as a technical device for having his way on the merits,
but as the real safeguard for the individual against the impositions
of government. Here the liberal doctrine requires little if any bowing
to legislative authority, for it is here that the charge of the Constitution to the judiciary is the clearest. The opinions also reveal that, if
a true judicial liberal will not rewrite a statute contrary to the clear
language, intent, and purpose of the legislature, he may nevertheless, where the statute affords equal authority for two or more readings, choose that meaning which most closely corresponds with the
benevolent concepts of substantive as well as procedural due process.

IV.

THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE

You may find it difficult to think of the next case that I will
discuss as a civil liberties case. After all, it involved a seizure of
property, not life or liberty, and it was a contest between government and a huge corporate enterprise. Nevertheless, I think that the
opinion is probably the most important that Jackson ever composed
and is directed at a more fundamental issue of liberty than construction of any of the Bill of Rights. I speak, of course, of the Steel
Seizure Case,44 in which Jackson wrote only a concurring opinion,
while Mr. Justice Black spoke for the Court's majority.
The case arose during the course of a "police action" conducted
by United Nations forces in Korea. Immediately before a strike call
by the Steelworkers was to go into effect, President Truman issued
an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the
steel mills and to keep them operating. The justification for the
42.
43.
44.

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581 (1952) (footnote omitted).
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 174 (1952).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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order was that steel was an indispensable element for war production and that a work stoppage would endanger the national security.
He relied on a conglomerate of powers set forth in Article II of the
Constitution, but particularly on the Commander-in-Chief power.
One difficulty with the Truman exercise in implied powers of
the Presidency that caused some concern to at least some of the
Justices was that in the then recent controversy over the TaftHartley Law, the executive branch had sought a seizure power and
been turned down by Congress.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court, on the question of prerogative raised by the steel companies effort to enjoin the seizure, was
simple. There is some anomaly in the fact that his position was that
of William Howard Taft, while the dissenters, led by Chief Justice
Vinson, espoused the point of view of Theodore Roosevelt, about the
powers of the Presidency.
For Justice Black, "The President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."45 There was, indeed, no statutory authority for the President's action. Nor was there any Constitutional authority. The Government's claim was one that has become all too familiar. "[It is
not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power
to the President. The contention is that presidential power should
be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution." 6 His authority could not be inferred from the Commanderin-Chief Clause, that is concerned with military operations in the
"theater of war." "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker."47
Thus, Mr. Justice Black in fact framed an opinion that stated
there were no implied powers of the Presidency. The President was
the agent of the legislature and had no lawmaking powers of his
own. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in his concurrence: ".

.

. the

considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of
separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible
than may appear from what Mr. Justice Black has written, ....
48
The dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson was equally uncomplicated. The President had found an emergency that required emergency action, at least until Congress acted. This power may be
45. Id. at 585.
46. Id. at 587.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 589.
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inferred not only from the Commander-in-Chief provision but also
from the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,.....49
Mr. Justice Jackson, with his experience as Attorney General
at the outbreak of World War II, was cognizant of the realities as
well as the theories of presidential action. He was unable to reduce
the issues to the simple question that had been the subject of the
majority and the dissenters' opinions. He suggested an outline that
has since become regarded as the rule of the case, despite the fact
that he wrote only for himself:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty ...
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling
the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system. 0
Mr. Justice Jackson then went into an extensive analysis and
concluded that in light of the refusal of Congress to give the President the power of seizure when he asked for it, the present situation
fell into the third category and the seizure was invalid. Again, a
reading of the full opinion will demonstrate to the reader the
strength of the mind of an advocate with keen analytic skills and
§

49.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

50.

343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (footnotes omitted).

3.
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extraordinary powers of rhetoric. But he was an advocate for the
Constitution and not for either of the contending parties or other
interests. It was not the steel mills nor the steel workers nor the
legislature nor the executive that weighted his arguments. It was
rather a realization that no more fundamental question about our
democratic system in a modern age could be raised. He demonstrated that, however casebook editors might classify the case, it
was a case of civil liberties because freedom was at stake.
Since then we have gained further experience with the problem
of the imperial presidency. None should think that the Korean War
was not an immediate precedent for the Viet Nam War. None
should think that Watergate was an idiosyncratic event caused by
the eccentricities of an egocentric President with royal pretensions.
Recent history reveals that the Watergate syndrome, with its secret
acts and enemy lists, with its Louis XIV complex-l'etat, c'est
moi-may be found to a greater or lesser degree in each of Nixon's
predecessors, even back to the President that Jackson served as
Attorney General.
What Jackson understood and stated here was a concept that
is fundamental to the cause of the liberal jurists: Democracy and a
constitutional system of checks and balances are also relevant to the
liberty of Americans. The failure of democracy and the consequent
failure of limited authority in any of the three branches of the national government could be catastrophic. And yet, even now we
approach the catastrophe without recognizing the need for fundamental changes in the existent distribution of powers. Choosing men
of good will for leadership is not sufficient, as Madame Gandhi has
taught us so well.
Jackson's conclusion was
that emergency powers are consistent with free government only
when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who
exercises them. That is the safeguard that would be nullified by our
adoption of the "inherent powers" formula. Nothing in my experience convinces me that such risks are warranted by any real necessity, although such powers would, of course, be an executive conveni5
ence.
It is important that everyone at least see the portrait of government as painted by Jackson in his opinion in the Steel Seizure case.
For it will be ignored only at the price of all civil rights and civil
liberties:
51.

Id. at 652.
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In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress
can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample
to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument
that we should affirm possession of them without statute. Such power
either has no beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit
to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge us
straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong
direction.
As to whether there is imperative necessity for such powers, it is
relevant to note the gap that exists between the President's paper
powers and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the
measure of the actual controls wielded by the modern presidential
office. That instrument must be understood as an EighteenthCentury sketch of a government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the
government that is. Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from
that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential
activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do
not show on the face of the Constitution.
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single
head in whose choice the whole nation has a part, making him the
focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and
finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone
he fills the public eye and ear. No other personality in public life can
begin to compete with him in access to the public mind through
modern methods of communciation. By his prestige as head of state
and his influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those
who are supposed to check and balance his power which often cancels
their effectiveness.
I cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer
if the Court refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the
expense of Congress.
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting
its problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools
belong to the man who can use them." We may say that power to
legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.
The essence of our free Government is "leave to live by no man's
leave, underneath the law"-to be governed by those impersonal
forces which we call law. Our Government is fashioned to fulfill this
concept so far as humanly possible. The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power. The executive action
we have here originates in the individual will of the President and
represents an exercise of authority without law. No one, perhaps not
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even the President, knows the limits of the power he may seek to exert
in this instance and the parties affected cannot learn the limit of their
rights. We do not know today what powers over labor or property
would be claimed to flow from Government possession if we should
legalize it, what rights to compensation would be claimed or recognized, or on what contingency it would end. With all its defects,
delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under
the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up."2
And so endeth the text of the liberal judges' creed on separation
of powers, or more correctly checks and balances, as the sine qua
non for a democratic society with freedom for individuals in that
society, which is, as I have suggested the goal of both liberals and
libertarians.
V.

EQUALITY AS CIVIL LIBERTY

It is since Jackson's time that the Supreme Court has turned
its attention to imposing an egalitarianism on American life. Equal
protection of the laws, prior to the decision of the Court in Brown
5 3 was a narrow conception of comparatively
v. Board of Education,
little moment in the life of the Constitution. As known to that time,
it was a concept that Jackson liked as a lesser restraint on the states
than the due process clause with its substantive content. Thus, he
said in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York:
My philosophy as to the relative readiness with which we should
resort to these two clauses is almost diametrically opposed to the
philosophy which prevails on this Court. While claims of a denial of
equal protection are frequently asserted, they are rarely sustained. ...
. . .Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process
grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many
people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does
not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have
a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states
and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to
discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable
52.

Id. at 653-55 (footnotes omitted).

53.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality
is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew,
and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon
a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the
door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus
to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to
assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operaton. 1

Those with any familiarity with the development of the equal
protection clause since Jackson's departure will readily see that his
concept of the standard and reason for the equal protection clause
is no longer deemed appropriate. His was a notion of equal treatment by the law. The later notions are more concerned with the use
of the law-the unequal use of the law-to bring about equality of
condition. Substantive equal protection has been substituted for
substantive due process as a means by which the courts undertake
to make policy determinations about the wisdom and desirability of
statutes. The equal protection clause no longer serves merely to void
laws that are not equal in their application. The choice is no longer
left to the legislature to decide to enlarge or diminish the class to
bring about equality of treatment. The laws are themselves rewritten by the courts to conform to judicial notions of social justice.
I find it difficult to believe that Mr.Justice Jackson would have
taken kindly to the changed concept of equal protection of the laws.
In a recent lecture at the University of Chicago, Professor Paul A.
Freund noted Oliver Wendell Holmes's remark that the Constitution did not incorporate Herbert Spencer's Social Statics and went
on to suggest that neither does the Constitution incorporate Professor John Rawl's "Social Ecstatics."5 5 But Holmes was wrong and so,
too, is Freund. The Constitution of Holmes's day, with its concepts
of liberty of contract and substantive due process, did indeed incorporate Spencer's Social Statics, and the current Constitution, at
least through the Warren Court, may as easily be said to invoke
Rawl's A Theory of Justice. Rawl's proposition is that any inequality of condition has to be justified and if it cannot be justified it has
to be rectified. We have come a very long way from the Jacksonian
54.
55.

336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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notion of the purpose and effect of the equal protecton clause.
Let this not be taken to suggest dissent by Jackson from the
decision in. the Brown case. Clearly the exclusion of children from a
public school because of the color of their skins would fall afoul of
the standard stated by Jackson in the Railway Express case. Mr.
Justice Jackson must have thought so. He was in a hospital bed
suffering from a heart attack when the time came to hand down the
Brown decision. He left that bed-it is said against doctors' orders-to demonstrate that the decision of the Court in Brown was
one supported by all nine Justices by sitting with his brethren on
the fateful day of that decision. He died before the Court was faced
with the problems of executing its judgment.
I am sure, too, that Mr. Justice Jackson had qualms about the
Brown decision. They did not, however, go to the merits of the
judgment, but rather to the lack of justification for it in the Court's
opinion, a lack of candor as well as a lack of authority. And even
more was he troubled by the question whether the substantial revision of the social structure of the nation could be achieved through
judicial rather than legislative and executive action.5" With the
power of hindsight, can we say, even today, that his troubles were
not real ones?
VI.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by attempting to respond to the question implicit in my assignment for tonight. It was the sponsors of this
lecture who stated the title: "Justice Robert Jackson-Impact on
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties." They might have ended the title
with a question mark, although in fact they did not. Assuming that
they had invoked the inquisitive mood and asked what effect did
Justice Jackson have on the consititutional law of civil rights and
civil liberties, I should have to respond by saying that Jackson's
impact has been very small indeed.
Jackson's tenure on the Court ended on 9 October 1954 with his
sudden death shortly after the Court reconvened for its 1954 term.
Clearly his work was far from finished. But had he remained, it
would probably have merely been an extension of the frustrations
that he suffered throughout most of his judicial tenure.
The Warren Court, as it has come to be called, was clearly a
libertarian court, with the ideas of Justices Black and Douglas in
the ascendant. There was no room here for the liberal mode.
56.

See KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
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Absolutes of constitutional meaning precluded the balances and
conditions that Jackson asserted. Rules were no longer tailored to
the resolution of particular cases. They were now "prophylactic"
as the modern jargon would have it, promulgated not to cure existent ills but to foreclose future ailments, real and imaginary. True,
Mr. Justice Black, toward the end of his career, often looked more
like a liberal than a libertarian. 5 But by then, the Court had passed
its leader.
Now, the Warren Court, too, is dead. But Jackson and judicial
liberalism are not revived. On its way from Warren Court doctrine
to Burger Court doctrine, if it can be called that, the Court has
again bypassed the liberal tradition. It tends to write absolutes of
its own. The Jacksonian dedication to reason, to the need to explain
constitutional opinions, especially those that make changes in the
law, weighs very lightly, if at all, on the current Court's membership. Suffice it for them that judgments are reached together with
a lengthy exegesis that more often hides than reveals reasons for the
decision.
I would say that neither Jackson's attitudes nor his craftsmanship, whether in the realm of civil liberties or elsewhere, has left a
deep mark on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. But he has
left an intellectual inheritance that may, like a phoenix, rise again.
This lecture was not, therefore, intended as a testimonial to the
present importance of the judicial efforts of Robert H. Jackson. But,
as Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote:
When his work is finished it is too late for praise to give the encouragement which all need, and of which the successful get too little.
Still, there is a pleasure in bearing one's testimony even at that late
time, and thus in justifying the imagination of posthumous power on
which all idealists and men not seeking the immediate rewards of
58
success must live.

Mr. Justice Jackson was such an idealist, although a practical
one. He saw that individual responsibility was the necessary concomitant of individual freedom. He saw that, in the end, the errors
of representative government were more tolerable for free men, than
the perfections of the corporate Leviathan.
Let me close with Jackson's own last words of testament. He
died after preparing but before delivering the Godkin lectures at
Harvard. His peroration for those lectures should be meaningful, in
light of current events, for both liberal and libertarian:
57.
58.

See Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 187.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 283 (1920).
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. . .In Great Britain, to observe civil liberties is good politics and to
transgress the rights of the individual or the minority is bad politics.
In the United States, I cannot say that this is so. Whether the political conscience is relieved because the responsibility here is made
largely a legal one, I cannot say, but of this I am sure: any court which
undertakes by its legal processes to enforce civil liberties needs the
support of an enlightened and vigorous public opinion which will be
intelligent and discriminating as to what cases really are civil liberties cases and what questions really are involved in those cases. I do
not think the American public is enlightened on this subject.
Sometimes one is tempted to quote his former self, not only to
pay his respects to the author but to demonstrate the consistency of
his views, if not their correctness. On the 150th anniversary of the
Supreme Court, speaking for the executive branch of the Government
as Attorney General, I said to the Justices:
"However well the Court and its bar may discharge their tasks,
the destiny of this Court is inseparably linked to the fate of our
democratic system of representative government. Judicial functions,
as we have evolved them, can be discharged only in that kind of
society which is willing to submit its conflicts to adjudication and to
subordinate power to reason. The future of the Court may depend
more upon the competence of the executive and legislative branches
of government to solve their problems adequately and in time than
upon the merits which is its own." 5
Mr. Justice Jackson was not a man for all seasons. At least his
was not the dominant voice on the Court that he graced. Nor was it
the voice of the Warren Court that succeeded his. And it appears
not to be that of the present Court that falls outside the teachings
both of our liberal and our libertarian Justices. But perhaps his can
be the mode of the Court of the future. That can be so, however,
only if his efforts and ideas are kept alive by continued study of
them by new generations of lawyers and law teachers. It is to encourage that possibility that I have offered these remarks. It is to you
that I give the charge. And so I wish you Godspeed.
59.
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